

# Location Services with Built-In Privacy

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# Location-based social networking

foursquare




Gowalla

Finally taking off?

# Why Privacy?

## THREAT LEVEL



PRIVACY, CRIME AND SECURITY ONLINE

### Feds 'Pinged' Sprint GPS Data 8 Million Times Over a Year

By [Kim Zetter](#) | December 1, 2009 | 5:42 pm | Categories: [Surveillance](#)

Case: 2009-215462

[Back](#) | [Print](#)

Target: ██████████

GPS ID	Request Date (CST)	Location Date (CST)	Status	Points	Accuracy	Bill
7715912	10/9/2009 9:42:31 AM	10/9/2009 9:45:30 AM	Success	40.00178 - 82.96392	4999.00*	D
7715434	10/9/2009 9:27:27 AM	10/9/2009 9:30:24 AM	Success	40.00069 - 82.97771	80.00	D

EFF, tech companies lobbying for ECPA revision

Why do service providers care? [Positive externality](#)

# What can we do privately

Proximity testing: detect when friends are nearby

When not nearby, friends don't see your location

Server never sees location

Building block for more complex functionality

# Proximity testing: some applications



Granularity must be user-configurable

# Client-server vs. peer-to-peer


	All-pairs	Friends-only
Client-server	✗	✓
Peer-to-peer	✓	✗

Only client-server model supports configurable granularity

Poor/nonexistent infrastructure for complex peer-to-peer protocols


# Mathematical formulation: not obvious

“Pairs of friends get notified whenever they are within 100ft of each other”




Triangulation attack

# Reducing proximity testing to equality testing





# Equality testing




Space of possible locations is small!

ElGamal-like cryptographic protocol based on  
Decisional Diffie Hellman (DDH) problem (Lipmaa)

Improved constant factor

Requires shared secret keys between pairs of friends

# Server participation




Server can pretty much learn everyone's location

# Server participation done right

Server can cause users to compute wrong answer  
but cannot cause privacy breach

Avoids need for big integer arithmetic  
Information-theoretic security



# Problem: online brute-force attack

If only there were a way to verify that a user really is where they claim to be...

# Location tags



GSM



Bluetooth®



Shared entropy pool

# Properties of location tags

Location tag = vector + matching function  
i.e., **space-time fingerprint**



## Unpredictability

cannot produce matching tag unless nearby

## Reproducibility

two devices at same place & time produce matching tags (not necessarily identical)

# Location tags using WiFi packets

Discard packets like TCP that may originate outside local network

- DHCP, ARP, Samba etc. are local

15 packets/sec on CS/EE VLAN

Two different devices see about 90% of packets in common

Protocol	Device 1	Device 2	Common
ARP	1088	1071	832
BROWSER	262	286	255
DHCP	249	237	208
MDNS	600	551	541
NBNS	1134	1190	1117
All	3333	3335	2953

# Location features

Each packet is a “location feature”

Timing, source/destination and other packet contents

At least around 10 bits of entropy

Tag with 15 location features gives  $> 80$ -bit security level



# Comparing location tags

Need to compare two vectors that match approximately: **fuzzy set intersection**

Basic concept:

Alice encodes vector as polynomial

Sends random points on polynomial to Bob

Intersection size is large → few enough “errors” →

Bob can decode using Berlekamp-Massey algorithm

# Shared secret keys

Traditional solution: PKI

PGP (un)usability study



Better solution: Identity-based encryption

Our solution: bind public keys to social identities

# SocialKeys

My Facebook profile


**Website:**

<http://www.cs.utexas.edu/~arvindn/>  
<http://33bits.org/>  
<http://arvindn.livejournal.com>  
[http://twitter.com/random\\_walker](http://twitter.com/random_walker)  
<http://randomwalker.info>


<https://socialkeys.org/pubkey?alg=DH&keylen=1024&p=oakley&g=2&key=LLI+IKCAIEHmjbAwTLSSj6EnbXG1w9NYp5msV7DbuPsteg2t3PJ1tSPYwjlqLPxjrbxZJe/FJwttbUf9Wf8Re7eZg4NVf>




# Android implementation




# Android implementation



# Android implementation



# Android implementation



# Other location privacy questions

Location based advertising



Location based search



Location statistics



# Summary

Proximity testing: useful primitive, tricky to define!

Improve constant factor in crypto protocols for  
Private Equality Testing

Location tags to enhance location privacy

SocialKeys: transparent crypto via key sharing over  
social networks

Thank you